Typewriter Leadership in a Facebook World - Meyerowich, Drew R.
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Typewriter Leadership in a Facebook World
Meyerowich, Drew R.
Synopsis "Typewriter Leadership in a Facebook World"
Throughout history, technology has played a vital role in combat. While improvements in weaponry are typically at the front of the military leader's minds, technology like the internet would not appear to be as significant. However, the internet has drastically increased the speed at which news and information travels around the world. While this fact alone does not change how military leaders must think both tactically and strategically, it does require leaders to be adaptive and responsive to the strategic impact of tactical news and information. Historically, information was a form of power closely guarded, secured, and provided only when there was a need to know. Modern communication equipment and the internet make global news available to anyone who wants it, or wants to provide it. Senior military leaders grew up in the Military during a period where this technology was not a reality. In that short period of time, typewritten forms were replaced by emails and instant messaging. Failing to adapt to the speed at which information travels has plagued today's military leadership in dealing with the management and understanding of information, traditional media, and new forms of media like the internet. Legacy policies towards information management have crippled the United States efforts against terrorism creating a military that is reactive and defensive towards what Thomas L. Friedman refers to as 'A Flat World.'; This monograph focuses on both these failures, and indicates a way ahead in understanding Strategic Communications (STRATCOMs) within the military and creating a culture that is both proactive and adaptive to the realities of STRATCOMs in the 21st Century. Military leadership failed to understand the strategic impact of key events in Afghanistan and Iraq. Compounding this lack of understanding was the ability to visualize the second and third order effects of military plans and operations in the strategic landscape. The failure to visualize these e
